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Abstract
This paper concerns two issues related to optimal income taxation. First,
we show how the labor income tax and the old age pension system interact in
the optimal tax and expenditure structure. Second, we derive marginal capital
income tax rates for high-ability and low-ability working individuals as well as for
the disabled.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a large literature on how public old age pensions and disability
pensions aﬀect the resource allocation. In the context of optimal nonlinear
income taxation, on the other hand, there are very few studies on how diﬀer-
ent parts of the social insurance system interact with the tax system in order
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1to redistribute income in an optimal way. An important exception is Crem´ er
et al. (2002) analyzing how public pensions interact with an optimal general
income tax in a model where the labor supply has two dimensions: hours of
work and retirement age. Boadway et al. (1999) address disability beneﬁts
in an optimal tax framework. Their main contribution is to characterize
the optimal tax and transfer system in an economy where the government
operates a costly welfare system.
The purpose of this short paper is to discuss two aspects of the interac-
tion between public pensions and income taxation. First, if the government
does not observe diﬀerences in productivity among working individuals, the
eﬃcient public policy implies a restriction on the sum of the marginal labor
income tax rate and the present value of the marginal pension beneﬁt. Sec-
ond, if health status is unobservable, it is important to design the tax and
beneﬁt system in a way such that individuals able to work do not want to
mimic the behavior of the disabled. We show how the capital income tax
may play an important role in this context. The analysis is based on an
extension of Stiglitz’ (1982) self-selection approach to optimal taxation. In
particular, we consider the overlapping generations (OLG) model analyzed
by Pirttil¨ a and Tuomala (2001), which is here extended to reﬂect the be-
havior of three types: high-ability individuals, low-ability individuals and
disabled.
2 The Model and the Results
Starting with the consumption side of the model, the utility function facing











2where c1t denotes consumption when young and c2t+1 consumption when
old, whereas zt is leisure. The individual only works when young, and the
hours of work are given by li
t = H − zi
t,w h e r eH is a time endowment.
The term βi is an indicator of health status; it takes the same value for the
employed low-ability and high-ability types, while it takes a diﬀerent value

























where i = 1 for the low-ability type and i = 2 for the high-ability type.
In equations (2) and (3), w is the wage rate, s savings, r the interest rate,
T(·) the labor income tax function, Φ(·) the capital income tax function
and P(·) the old age pension beneﬁt formula. We can interpret P(wi
t,l i
t)a s
the pension beneﬁt per individual of type i in period t + 1. The disabled
individuals are denoted by i = 0, and we assume that the disabled do not













where b is the disability beneﬁt. For the generation born in period t,t h e






The production side of the economy consists of identical competitive
ﬁrms producing a homogenous good. Given these characteristics, the num-
ber of ﬁrms is not important and will be normalized to one. The production




t,K t), where Ni
t is the number of young
3individuals of type i in period t,w h e r e a sKt is the aggregate capital stock.
By using the ﬁrst order conditions, we can derive equilibrium expressions
for the wage rates and the interest rate. For later use, the wage ratio (or




t,K t). The capital







We are now in the position to formulate the optimal tax and expenditure
problem. In accordance with Pirttil¨ a and Tuomala (2001), we assume that
the government maximizes a general social welfare function, in which the














subject to self-selection constraints and a resource constraint. There are two
types of self-selection constraints. First, by assuming that redistribution
among the employed aims at redistributing from high income earners to low
income earners, we do not want the employed high-ability type to mimic



















for all t,w h e r eˆ U is used to denote that a working high-ability type mimics
the working low-ability type, and β = β1 = β2. The remaining self-selection
constraint serves to prevent the employed low-ability type from mimicking
















1To simplify the analysis, we disregard the possibility of identifying the disabled by
means other than the self-selection constraint on tax and expenditure policies. For analy-
ses of tagging in combination with taxation, see Akerlof (1978) and Boadway et al. (1999).
4for all t. With equations (7) and (8) at our disposal, note that an employed
high-ability type would always prefer his/her own allocation than that of
the disabled, meaning that no additional self-selection constraint is needed.
Turning, ﬁnally, to the resource constraint, we assume that the govern-
ment balances its budget in each time period. The tax revenues consist of
all pure proﬁts (if any) as well as the revenues from the labor income tax
and the capital income tax, whereas the public expenditures refer to old age
pension beneﬁts and disability pension beneﬁts. By combining the budget
constraint for the government with the individual budget constraints, we























2t − Kt+1 =0 ( 9 )
Following Pirttil¨ a and Tuomala (2001), we assume that the government
is able to credibly commit to a tax and expenditure structure, where all parts
have to be chosen subject to the self-selection constraints. Let λt and µt be
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the self-selection constraints given
by equations (7) and (8), respectively, whereas γt is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the resource constraint. We begin by characterizing the
eﬃcient labor income tax structure and old age pension structure. Denote
by T  (wi
tli
t)a n dP (wi
tli
t) the marginal labor income tax rate and marginal
pension beneﬁt, respectively, for type i and consider Proposition 1;










































































t = λt(∂ ˆ U2
t /∂c2
1t)/γ and θi
t =1+rt+1(1 − Φ (si
trt+1)).
5Proposition 1 implies that, if the capital income tax rates are optimally
chosen (see below), then the present value of the marginal tax-beneﬁte ﬀect,
T  (wili) − (1/θi
t)P (wili), plays the same role as the marginal income tax
rate would do in the absence of pensions2. The present value of the mar-
ginal tax-beneﬁte ﬀect is, in turn, interpretable in terms of the self-selection
constraint that serves to eliminate the incentive for the working high-ability
type to mimic the working low-ability type. As can be seen, the self-selection
constraint aﬀects the present value of the marginal tax-beneﬁte ﬀect for the
working low-ability type via two channels. First, the slope of the indiﬀer-
ence curves diﬀers between the low-ability type and the mimicker, which
typically provides an incentive to increase the present value of the marginal
tax-beneﬁte ﬀect for the low-ability type. Second, an increase the hours of
work aﬀects the wage ratio and, therefore, the utility of the mimicker. The
following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1;
Corollary 1: If the pension beneﬁtf o r m u l ai sr e s t r i c t e dt oP(wili)=αwili,
where α is a constant, then the pension system works to increase the marginal
labor income tax rates for both ability types.
Corollary 1 is interesting primarily in the sense of highlighting a relevant
special case: pension beneﬁt formulas are often deﬁned in terms of a re-
placement ratio. The intuition behind Corollary 1 is, of course, that ’eﬀec-
tive progression’ is deﬁned in terms of the marginal tax-beneﬁte ﬀect. If the
pension system tends to decrease the marginal tax-beneﬁte ﬀect, there is an
incentive to adjust the labor income tax accordingly.
The capital income tax structure is characterized in Proposition 2;
2This is analogous to a result in the literature on income taxation and commodity
taxation, meaning that the eﬀective marginal tax rate plays the same role as the marginal
income tax rate would to in the absence of commodity taxes. See e.g. Edwards et al.
(1994).
































































































Proposition 2 is important for two reasons. First, it provides a comple-
ment to Pirttil¨ a and Tuomala (2001), who consider taxation of savings (not
capital income) for the employed low-ability and high-ability types. Second,
and more importantly, it also characterizes the marginal capital income tax
rate of the disabled. Therefore, we concentrate the discussion to the ﬁrst
part of Proposition 2; the other two tax formulas can be interpreted in a
similar way. The capital income tax formula for the disabled contains two
parts, both of which are associated with the self-selection constraint. The
ﬁrst term on the right hand side means that the marginal capital income
tax rate depends on whether the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption in periods 1 and 2 facing the disabled exceeds, or falls short of,
that of the mimicking low-ability type. As such, the more (less) the disabled
value current consumption relative to the valuation of current consumption
by the mimicker, the higher (lower) the marginal capital income tax rate
facing the disabled. The second term on the right hand side implies that
7the marginal capital income tax rate also depends on how the capital stock
in period t + 1 (via savings in period t)i n ﬂuences the wage ratio. If an
increase in the capital stock increases (decreases) the wage ratio, it makes
mimicking less (more) attractive. This provides, in turn, an incentive for
the government to increase (decrease) savings via a lower (higher) capital
income tax rate. As a consequence, capital income taxation of the disabled
serves, in part, as an instrument to redistribute among low and high income
earners.
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